Abstract. This article examines centre-periphery relations in postcolonial India and Pakistan, providing a specific comparative history of autonomy movements in Nagaland and Baluchistan (1973-7). It highlights the key role played by the central governmentparticularly by Jawaharlal Nehru and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto -in quelling both insurgencies and in taking further steps to integrate these regions. It argues that a shared colonial history of political autonomy shaped local actors' resistance to integration into the independent nationstates of India and Pakistan. This article also reveals that Indian and Pakistani officials used their shared colonial past in very different ways to mould their borderlands policies. India's central government under Nehru agreed to a modified Naga State within the Indian Union that allowed the Nagas a large degree of autonomy, continuing a colonial method of semiintegration. In contrast, Bhutto's government actively sought to abandon longstanding Baluch political and social structures to reaffirm the sovereignty of the Pakistani state. The article explains this divergence in terms of the different governing exigencies facing each country at the time of the insurgencies. It ultimately calls for an expansion in local histories and subnational comparisons to extend understanding of post-1947 South Asia, and the decolonizing world more broadly. 
Afghanistan, the Indian or Pakistani state had to assert its power and legitimacy both to its own citizens and the international community. In India and Pakistan's sparsely populated peripheries, which had a history of limited interaction with the state, local resistance movements emerged.
Scholars have done remarkably little work on the comparative histories of postindependence India and Pakistan. Ayesha Jalal's Democracy and authoritarianism in South Asia looms over this small field, while the few other studies that do take a comparative approach largely address the similarities and differences between India and Pakistan's governing systems at large, for example the opportunities and limitations of the two countries' federal structures. 1 In her macro-level study, Jalal emphasizes the importance of and laws, to introducing administrators, to building economic and political infrastructuresbut with differing success. In Nagaland and Baluchistan, the state also has turned to coercive measures -armed force -to assert its rule.
Studying borderland regions is an effective way of assessing a state's assertion of its sovereignty. In these zones, the performance of sovereignty is twofold, for both internal and ... We have therefore to be rather careful in our dealings with these people, lest we produce a problem which may pursue us for long years later. The movement by some Nagas in Assam and the neighbouring tribal area for an independent Naga State became critical in the early 1950s, though its roots lay in the preindependence period. Some scholars have identified a Naga 'nation' from an earlier stage, while others have argued that unity among the tribes that became identified as 'Nagas'
resulted from British colonial influence. 11 The Naga population was largely divided between NEFA, particularly the Tuensang Frontier Division, and the Naga Hills District, part of the State of Assam, though it spread into Manipur and across the international border into Burma.
While some Nagas integrated into colonial governing systems, particularly around Kohima and directly ruled regions, others in the hill areas where the British exercised fewer controls remained largely isolated from colonial (and subsequent) governing structures.
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As the transfer of power became imminent, a self-constituted body of Naga government officials and leaders around the city of Kohima named the Naga National Council (NNC), which, according to British officials, was 'as representative a body as can be found of the more educated Nagas', sent a request to the British government asking for a tenyear interim government, at the end of which Nagas could either choose to join the Indian Union or pursue independence. 13 'There has to be a break from the past before we can even fashion the future. To imagine that the situation will gradually improve and without our taking some such step is, I think, not reasonable or wise'. 24 Medhi also emphasized that 'The situation in the Naga Hills has brought to the forefront the grave dangers which lie to the security and integrity of India as a result of troubles which can be started by trained and armed guerilla bands in a small area'.
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However, while Nehru argued for compromise and potentially changing the relationship between Assam and the Nagas, the Assam State government resisted.
While members of the Assam State government also promoted a political settlement to the Naga problem, they vehemently protested the Union government's choice to assume control of Nagaland, also because of its borderlands location. They perceived that Union policy towards Nagaland had the potential to disrupt relations in the northeast more The feeling of isolation and not being part of India of the Nagas you refer to is unfortunately a conception which is not confined to the Nagas alone. … I am afraid, we might be led to further complications with the hill people in some other hill districts of the State as a result.
The only difference so far as the Nagas are concerned is that they have a much greater martial tradition than other hill people of our State. The Naga area is of course not comparable at all to these States in area, population or resources. The broad principle which is followed by us even in regard to these States is that they must shoulder their own financial burden for the administration and indeed for part of their development. 30 Officials nevertheless justified a Naga State because of its unique history as a borderlands region. At a press conference on 11 August 1960, Mr. Nehru said the creation of a new Naga state should give no encouragement to the protagonists of Punjabi Suba because the Naga areas had been treated as a separate entity for many years. Under the new set-up these areas were not being separated from another entity:
they were simply being given a higher status. 
III
In some ways, events in Baluchistan followed a similar trajectory to those in Nagaland, but with far wider ramifications. 32 Questions of political autonomy also were at the centre of the conflict, but the Baluch resistance initially spawned from national, rather than Pakistani leaders responded with armed force in 1948 and compelled the Khan to sign a treaty of accession (the Khan's brother tried to continue the rebellion but was arrested). 33 Kalat remained largely autonomous during the first years of independence, as did former British Baluchistan, which continued to be governed through local jirgas, or tribal meetings, despite increasingly coming into conflict with the Muslim League. 34 As in the case of Nagaland, Baluch suspicions concerned the imposition of cultural values from one province to another; in particular, Indian high commission officials reported local fears that Urdu was to be imposed on Baluchistan as its official language after the unpopular forced merger of Kalat, Kharam, Las Bela, and Makran in the Baluchistan States Union. 35 The creation of the 'mitigate the harshness of the operations and to associate civil officials with requisite experience with these operations' so as 'not leave any scope for supporters and possible supporters of Government to swing over to the side of the hostiles', the realization that Phizo's independence movement had widespread support in the Naga Hills and reports from local administrators that 'It is the definite public opinion that the Naga rebellion is due to the inertia, callousness, indifference, and progressive deterioration of efficiency the Central and State Govts.' meant that the Indian government needed to take action to reinforce its presence in the region. 54 The army provided such a mechanism. While Nehru repeatedly cautioned for the need to limit force, Bhutto demonstrated fewer qualms with sending the Pakistan Army into Baluchistan, though he also maintained that it undertook only limited action (in the 1974 white paper, he even claimed that aerial strafing never occurred, a widely disputed claim).
Bhutto instead relied on the assertion that the interference of foreign powers, particularly These Naga troubles and revolts have a large significance for us in the international sphere and they give a handle to our opponents everywhere. More particularly, of course, Pakistan takes advantage of them. In view of our tense situation in regard to Pakistan, we have to be wary always and it is unfortunate that we should be tied up in the Naga Hills etc., when some other emergency might have to be faced by us. 56 Even after granting Naga Statehood, Indian security forces remained in Nagaland as a result of continued resistance by Nagas, led by Phizo, who still demanded independence. As late as 1972, M. C. Pant, Deputy Director of the Cabinet Secretariat, noted, 'Phizo is reported to have disclosed to some of his friends that he was satisfied with the assistance he was getting from China both in terms of financial and material aid extended to the rebel Naga Government'. 57 Throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s (and beyond), armed forces hunted insurgents, arresting them and confiscating weapons, leading to flare-ups in violence in the region despite an official ceasefire.
The fact that these regions were also important borderlands only made their integration that much more important: interventions, real and imagined, by outside forces concerned officials in both countries. But because these regions were geographically peripheral to major centres of power in either state -and because the McMahon and Durand
Lines were so porous -implementing these assertions proved more difficult. The flight of Baluch refugees to Afghanistan to escape Pakistani bombing demonstrated that armed force was not particularly successful, as it displaced rather than quelled the local population. Naga rebel groups continued to pass through Burma to China, particularly after the rupture of SinoIndian relations and the 1963 war, to train in Chinese-organized military camps and acquire Pakistani and Chinese funding and weapons. 58 Thus, armed force was not particularly effective as a performance of state sovereignty in these frontier regions; while it punished the local populations and brought them into direct contact with state forces, it did not subdue the most anti-state actors, who continued to seek aid from abroad, thanks, in large part, to the ease with which they could cross into, and through, neighbouring countries. The presence of poorly managed borders only complicated governing and integration attempts.
In one historical irony, the creation of the State of Nagaland within the Indian Union actually complicated the central government's attempts to demarcate its borders. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, as the Indian government strove to confirm the Indo-Burma border, the Chief Minister of Nagaland intervened, pointing out that a number of representations from the local public in Nagaland had been received opposing the erection of any permanent boundary pillars in the Nagaland sector. The main reasons given were that (1) many Naga villagers living on Indian side had their fields on the other side; (2) in some cases a portion of a village fell on Indian side and the other portion on the Burmese side; (3) the Chiefs who were entitled to certain customary tributes either in form of cash or in kind, or even in the form of a free labour, lived on Indian side, but his subjects lived on the Burmese side. 59 The subsequent exchange between the Chief Minister and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi highlighted the difficulties of imposing national boundaries that did not match lived realitiesand furthermore, that the presence of an interested State government could complicate rather than alleviate border-building. Gandhi tried to emphasize that the newest agreement between India and Burma 'merely formalised the traditional boundary delineated on the maps', and promised that the agreement had little real impact on the ground; the Chief Minister, however, refused to be quelled and hinted, 'if the Government of India were to give away any portion of the land belonging to the Nagas on our side to Burma then the situation would become more disturbing on this important international border'. 60 The Union government nevertheless proceeded to demarcate the border and erect boundary pillars.
As military intervention failed to bring peace to Nagaland and Baluchistan, and as 
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It also served as a means of 'rehabilitating', in the words of Indian officials, Naga insurgents. In response to a question put forward in the Lok Sabha, after the 1957 agreement between the Naga National Convention and the government had led to an official ceasefire, Nehru revealed a program of road, bridge, and house construction; training in handicrafts and technical subjects; student stipends; and housing and business loans intended to bring local Nagas into contact with the Indian government. 63 Bhutto also valued development and justified the army's continued presence in Baluchistan for its capacity to build roads, school, and hospitals, though for largely political means. As Shahid Javed Burki has demonstrated, Bhutto's development projects were predominantly intended to shore up his Pakistan's Peoples Party and to wean supporters from the NAP. Thus, he undertook spectacular rather than necessary projects such as the Lowari Pass tunnel project connecting the former northern princely states to the NWFP. Bhutto sanctioned 300 development projects in Baluchistan alone, but because they could not be implemented through existing governing structures, he created 'Prime Minister's Directives' by which he could order such projects to move forward. 64 Bhutto thus used development projects to reaffirm his rule over the federal and provincial governments, arguably more than for the benefit of Pakistan's citizens.
These different approaches to development reflected Nehru and Bhutto's contrasting approaches to their borderlands 'tribal' policies. As mentioned earlier, Nehru's approach to Nagaland, as with much of NEFA, was moulded by an intention to undo and actively reverse colonial policies (at least in theory, as his use of violence had overt colonial overtones).
Referring to historic colonial recourse to violence against the Nagas, he explained to Union
Minister of Revenue and Expenditure that 'these frontier tribal people are tough. They have been mis-handled somewhat in the past; hence our difficulties'. 65 Nehru's envisioned policies towards the northeastern tribes, including the Nagas, entailed the slow political, administrative, and economic integration of the region, though his government also emphasized preserving local culture, history, and 'tribality', as Bérénice Guyot-Réchard has shown. 66 In effect, Nehru anticipated winning local loyalty by providing economic support while preserving cultural autonomy -a policy that differed little from the British system under Sandeman, where cultural and social difference was also maintained. To bridge further the gap between Union and frontier, Nehru's government considered various power-sharing relationships to bring a state presence into the frontier region -not merely to maintain law and order but ultimately to introduce federal and State laws and practices. These failed to take root in Nagaland. To draw the local populations into political dialogue with the Union government, Nehru first pursued representative 'autonomous district councils' in 1952, which had powers such as taxation and expenditure and were effectively meant to introduce Indian democracy at a local scale. 67 The majority of Nagas in the Naga Hills District, however, refused to cooperate; Nehru reported, 'They are so well disciplined that they have prevented tribes. 72 His narrative is remarkably similar in style and word choice to that of the nineteenthand early twentieth-century British officer's memoir-cum-anthropological study, many of which similarly spoke of bringing the state to the northwest frontier. In contrast, Akbar 77 The creation of Nagaland was a necessary compromise to ensure that India retained the same territorial space it had inherited in 1947 and did not succumb to 'Balkanization'. The creation of Nagaland, then, further cemented the perimeters of Indian sovereignty.
In contrast, Bhutto's actions in Baluchistan were much weightier; his policies were directed not so much at integration and reaffirming national sovereignty, but at preventing The Government of India was certainly not prepared to acquiesce in a situation in which the writ of the legitimate Government did not run. As the Ministers in Nagaland had failed to establish their own authority, there was no option but to get the Army to do so. This hard line had been adopted two years ago and it had the effect of restoring the authority of the Government of Nagaland so that its writ did now run throughout the length and breadth of the State. 79 Even now, a pass system remains in place to decide who can and cannot enter Nagaland, an overt expression of Indian sovereign power over the State. Access to Nagaland is still restricted depending on perceived levels of local resistance to state controls.
In Baluchistan, Bhutto initially announced that the counterinsurgency was officially There, different political and social relationships have been allowed to persist, rather than forced to conform. Nehru's choice effectively to reaffirm colonial-style governing relations, rather than the push and pull of centre-State relations, has been the decisive factor in Nagaland's creation and subsequent trajectory. These case studies emphasize the nuances and complexities of local political developments that must be recognized alongside all-India or all-Pakistan -or all-South Asia -historical narratives. More localized histories can belie the national histories that so frequently dominate scholarship on decolonization and the decolonizing world. Instead by studying and comparing subnational historical trajectories, we can nuance our understanding of a state's postcolonial trajectory, the varying impacts of colonial legacies, and shifting power relationships across time and space.
